Witness seminar: The Cold War challenge to the Christian Churches.

Held at London Metropolitan University on Thursday, 29 November, 2012.

Panel: **Paul Oestreicher** and **John Arnold**, former Anglican canons central to the activities of the British Council of Churches' 'East-West Relations Advisory Committee'.

Michael Bourdeaux, also a former Anglican canon and the founder and president of the Keston Institute.

Xenia Dennen, Chairman of the Keston Institute and a Christian activist supporting the right to religious freedom during the Cold War.

Werner Kraetschell, former Superintendent of the Protestant parish in Berlin-Pankow, East Germany.

*Introduction by **Dianne Kirby**: Despite the long neglect accorded religion as an important variable in the Cold War, the last decade has witnessed not only a proliferation of scholarship on the subject, but even the attribution of causal significance. As the religious dimension of the twentieth century's dominant conflict becomes established as a subgenre of Cold War studies, this witness seminar brings together key players in the religious Cold War to examine the challenges with which it presented the churches, churchmen and Christians in general either side of the East-West divide.*

Western political leaders sought to appropriate Christianity for their ideological struggle with Soviet communism, which, regardless of Marxist strictures regarding religion, had no hesitation in mobilising its own religious resources throughout the Soviet bloc. Hence the Cold War evolved into a politico-religious enterprise that vastly complicated the aspirations of the churches for an independent role in the international, as well as the domestic, arena.

It should never be forgotten that the Cold War represented an era in which peoples lived in fear of nuclear annihilation, yet the quest for peace, a traditional preserve of the churches, became a political minefield for clerics: a test of loyalty in the communist regimes, a suspect pursuit in the west. Whilst some churchmen advocated Christian-Marxist dialogue, others insisted on the absolute incompatibility of Christianity and Communism. Of those western churchmen who reached across the East-West divide, some saw hope and progress in the activities of the 'official' churches, while others saw only persecution and oppression and directed their support to the 'underground' churches. Whilst Orthodox churchmen in the East perceived a duty to 'save' their communist leaders, some rightwing Christians in the West felt an equal duty to destroy them.

As the multi-faceted role of the churches comes to be appreciated by contemporary scholars, the panel will recall their perceptions of the period and its impact on Christian aspirations and ecclesiastical relations. They will discuss their personal experiences, their different approaches and the disputes that divided them despite their common aims in the promotion of better East-West relations and the protection

of faith behind the Iron Curtain. Their lived knowledge and informed accounts of this important period will provide crucial insights into key questions, including the extent to which the churches contributed to the peaceful resolution of the Cold War. Their witness testimony will add immeasurably to understanding the conduct and nature of the religious Cold War and the legacy it bequeathed to the post-Cold War world.

Philip Walters: I'm Philip Walters. I used to be head of research at Keston College, the Keston Institute, and I specialise in the former Soviet Union. I am now the editor of the journal *Religion, State and Society*, which started life as *Religion in Communist Lands*.

Merrilyn Thomas (UCL): Thank you. My name is Merrilyn Thomas, and I am an honorary research fellow at UCL. I wrote my thesis on the role of the churches in East Germany in the 1960s, the Anglican churches and the Lutheran churches in East Germany. I have also written a book on the subject.

Dianne Kirby: And also a book on the Cold War.

MT: And on the Cold War, yes. The whole Cold War from beginning to end. A beginner's guide, very useful.

Chimaroke Mgba: My name is Chimaroke Mgba. I am a Nigerian, and I specialise in democratisation and globalisation.

Serafim Florea (Kingston University): Good afternoon everyone. My name is Serafim Florea, and I am a graduate of international conflict management from Kingston University. My field of research is how political religion, carried both by governmental institutions and also by church institutions, influenced conflict around the world. By "conflict" I mean not only armed conflict but also Cold War conflict, which happens at various levels in terms of the forces involved, including banking and other kinds of things. At the moment I am involved with a registered charity which advances political study, which means looking at the whole but also not losing the connection with the elements that form the whole.

Xenia Dennen: Serafim is from Moldova.

Serafim Florea: I am from the Republic of Moldova, where we have a so-called frozen conflict following the Soviet Union split. This means that the Russians are occupying our Moldovian territory with their armies, and therefore our country is stuck between East and West.

Kirby: If you ask any questions or speak at all during the session, please identify yourself for the recording. Lucien?

Lucien Leustean (Birmingham): Hello, everybody. My name is Lucien Leustean. I was born in Romania, not very far from my colleague here, but I am currently a senior lecturer in Politics at Aston University in Birmingham. Why I am here, and why I am interested in the Soviet Union, first of all I edited a book on Eastern Christianity and the Cold War. Some of you may be familiar with that title. More recently, I have just

completed a project on the politics of religious bodies in the Soviet Union, the relationship between European institutions and churches. I'm very happy to be here.

John Pollard (Cambridge): Hello, my name is John Pollard, and I'm from the University of Cambridge. I'm a historian of the papacy in the twentieth century, Roman Catholicism and fascism. I am writing a book called *The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, 1914-58*, and I have just spent three excruciating months trying to write a chapter on Pius XII and the Cold War. I think that tells you where I'm coming from.

Mario Kucera (London Met): Good afternoon, my name is Mario Kucera and I am a research student here under the kind supervision of Professor Hinds. My research subject is the European Union, but I find this topic of the Cold War and religion interesting.

Michael Kandiah: Hi, I'm Michael Kandiah. I am the director of the Witness Seminar programme, of which this session is part. Basically, my job is to collect oral histories like this and make them available on the web, and so forth. But I do have a Cold War connection. I have edited books and I have a number of publications on the Cold War, although in a very different area.

Judith Rowbotham: I'm Judith Rowbotham, and I am at Nottingham Trent University. I am an interdisciplinary scholar, working between the areas of history, law and criminology. I co-founded and run the network that Eric Hinds is part of, so I am experienced with this seminar chair, but I am particularly interested in this topic because I was an undergraduate at Lampeter in the '70s. I also come from a long line of Anglican clergy on both sides of my family, so I grew up with debates and then I went to Lampeter.

Kirby: Before the panel introduce themselves I have some announcements on how we're going to proceed. This witness seminar will be recorded and transcribed, and speakers should keep in mind that they are on the record. No-one else attending the witness seminar should attempt to record it. If there is time there will be comments and questions from the audience. Most importantly, all speakers including those from the floor must identify themselves before making their comments. This is to ensure correct transcription and attribution. Each speaker, whether on the panel or from the floor, must be sure to sign the consent form which has been made available.

Before the transcript of the witness seminar is published the draft manuscript will be sent to each contributor, panellist or speaker from the floor. Each participant will have an opportunity to make amendments, corrections or deletions. The subsequent edited and corrected transcript of the witness seminar will be published. The recording of the witness seminar that will be made available will also be edited, principally to delete those portions of the utterances that speakers wish to have removed, but not those corrections relating to editing for sense and readability. The event will not operate under what is often called the Chatham House rule. Even though the transcript will be redacted where necessary, speakers will be attributed. The witness seminar is divided into two sessions, with a break in-between. I think we can now make a start.

To begin, I welcome everybody to this inaugural seminar, launching the British part of what is actually a global research project called Christian World Community and the Cold War. Today's event has been made possible by support from the Lipman-Miliband Trust and the Phillips-Price Memorial Trust. Special thanks must go to Metropolitan University, especially Professor Geoff Hayes, to King's College and Michael Kandiah, and to my own institution, the University of Ulster.

The aim of today's event is to bring together scholars who are exploring the complex questions around the impact of the Cold War on churches and churchmen, with our panel who lived through and were a part of what has come to be termed the religious Cold War. We will have a break at about 2:15 and restart at about 2:40. Questions and contributions from the audience are welcome, as the concept behind the witness seminar is that of a conversation, primarily between our panellists, but involving us all.

Today's event will focus on the challenge to and responses of the Christian community either side of the Iron Curtain to the East-West conflict, and the dilemmas with which the Cold War confronted the churches. Our panel, Xenia Dennen, Paul Oestreicher, John Arnold, Michael Bourdeaux and Werner Kraetschell, will begin by each giving a brief synopsis explaining how they came to be cold warriors for Christianity, as it were, and what they considered to be their key aims and objectives. I'll be traditional, and go with ladies first. Xenia, would you like to start?

Xenia Dennen: Actually, I feel that I am the one who is most unworthy to be here. I was really a sort of backroom girl, in that I got involved after finishing my course in Russian literature at Oxford. I met Michael Bourdeaux in 1966 and decided to work for him rather than be recruited by MI5, because I didn't want to spend my life not being able to talk about what I was doing. My work and my course at Oxford had covered eighteenth and nineteenth century literature. I was really, really fascinated by what was going on among the churches in the Soviet Union. It was absolutely riveting. So I started working with Michael in February 1967, and was dealing with *samizdat* records, protests and trial records being brought to us, who knows by what routes, and I was translating them and writing about them. I got personally very involved with Christians who were having a hard time in the Soviet system. I was involved in the foundation of the Keston Institute in 1969, and in 1973 I founded and then edited for seven years the journal which Philip now edits, which in my day was called *Religion in Communist Lands*. And I wrote and edited, and then became a member of the council, and I am now chairman.

Kirby: Thank you. With the introduction to Keston, perhaps we should go to Michael next?

Michael Bourdeaux: I have often been struck by the fact that John Arnold and I have similar origins, in that we were both studying theology in the late 1950s. We were both extremely enthusiastic about ecumenical relations, and I truly believed that I would see a reunion between the Orthodox Church and the Anglican Church within my lifetime, poor deluded individual that I was. John spent a lot of time in East Germany, for various reasons. I was lucky enough to be selected in the first group of students ever to spend an academic year in the Soviet Union. I went there in September 1959, and from that point—almost from the first day—I experienced the

renewed persecution of the church under Khrushchev. You can date it precisely, because there was a journal called *Science and Religion*, *Nauka i Religiia*, the first issue of which exactly coincided with my arrival, and this became the flagship of the renewed persecution. My ecumenical contacts developed during that time. The Reverend Francis House came. He was head of a delegation from the World Council of Churches, and we had long discussions over Christmas about the situation of the church. Through him, my reports went back to Geneva.

However, when I returned to the UK in the summer of 1960 I found there was a widespread reluctance to believe that things had deteriorated so fast and so sharply in the Soviet Union. It seemed to me that there was a belief that all in the Church field was relatively well after 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev gave his speech denunciating Stalin. During subsequent visits to the Soviet Union I experienced the situation getting worse and worse. A group of Christians approached me and when I said, "What can I do to help?" they said, "Be our voice and speak for us".

The only way to do that was to document the situation, and documents began in the form of *samizdat* self-published illegally circulating material. These documents began not only to circulate but eventually to pour out of the Soviet Union, and they were detailed and of an extremely high calibre. My work really began in a serious way before Keston College was founded by collecting those documents. However, before long it became obvious that there was huge tension within the area that I was studying and trying to write the truth about, not least because the Russian Orthodox Church joined the World Council of Churches at the New Delhi Assembly. John was there and went on to the Soviet Union afterwards, and that is his story.

John Arnold: That was in 1961.

MB: From that moment onwards the tendency was to believe the blander statements. Eventually, the direct misinformation provided by the Russian Orthodox delegations went first of all to the permanent staff in Geneva and then to delegations all around the world. So it was an era, sadly, of conflict. And even the hard-based facts that we were concerned with were sometimes not believed, or if believed we were told that we were harming the situation of those in the Soviet Union who provided the information. Many times I was told that it would have been better if I had simply stopped. Is that enough? Have I had my time?

Kirby: Yes.

MB: I will come back to that in the second part.

Kirby: Paul, please could you introduce yourself?

Paul Oestreicher: My name is Paul Oestreicher. I was born in that part of Germany that later became the DDR, East Germany. I fled from there because of my Jewish grandparents and grew up in New Zealand. I'm an Anglican priest and a Quaker, and my academic studies, such as they are, were in politics. At the University of Bonn I did political research on the relationship of Christianity to Marxism, and published two books on that subject in the '60s of the last century. In 1964 I was invited by the British Council of Churches to be the first secretary of the committee concerned with

East-West relations, the East-West Relations Advisory Committee of the British Council of Churches. I was its secretary, and John Arnold became its chairman. Basically, that Committee continued its work throughout the Cold War, and produced probably the first relatively popular book describing the situation in all the so-called socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The book was called *Discretion and Valour*, and it was a piece of public education on the subject.

I combined that professional work for the British Council of Churches with my own commitment to the peace movement. I was and remain the vice president of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. I saw my role very much as fighting the Cold War, by which I mean that the Cold War was my enemy, not taking sides in it. I saw myself in a diplomatic role, and astonishingly I was never approached by the security services of either side, although on both sides I was suspected of working for the security services of the other side. Luckily, I was never tempted to do either. I think that's enough as an introduction.

Kirby: Thank you. John Arnold?

John Arnold: Thank you. I was going up to Cambridge to read modern languages in the early 1950s, which made it natural for me to volunteer to go on the Russian course, and eventually to qualify as an interpreter and be commissioned in the intelligence corps. Unlike Paul, who is a pacifist, I am actually a Cold Warrior. I was a soldier in the Cold War. Incidentally it was a very small unit, which included Michael Frayne and Alan Bennett, so I am used to having my wits sharpened by interlocutors, but that wasn't a patch on having to sit between Paul and Michael for twenty-odd years on the East-West Relations Advisory Committee.

My first experience of religion behind the Iron Curtain was in Berlin in 1956, with a group of idealistic Christian students who were helping to rebuild Berlin with their bare hands as an act of reconciliation. The leader of our group was both a very good Christian and also a committed Communist. I learned from the start that for us, at least in Europe, it is not just black and white. We are not Manichees, we are Christians, and we learned to live with fifty shades of grey.

My wife, Anneliese, had been a student at the celebrated University of Halle, where she was arrested and imprisoned for being a Christian, which was providential for us because we met. Of course, she could not return to her family after she had escaped to the West, and for twenty years I was her only contact with her family. Meanwhile I had a career in the Church, and became in effect the ecumenical officer of the Church of England and chairman of the East-West Relations Advisory Committee of the British Council of Churches. This meant that I lived a double life, living together with Christians in Eastern Europe, and in the memorable phrase of our guru, Sir John Lawrence, seeing things from the point of view of the toad beneath the harrow. I also engaged in official contacts, both with Church and state.

My sympathies were of course with the humiliated and the insulted, but my work was in ecclesiastical diplomacy. I think that combination of official and unofficial engagement, which came together in the East-West Relations Advisory Committee, was in fact beneficial. Paul and Michael and I came from different standpoints, had different experience and different possibilities, but we had each other's confidence,

and we could meet with about a dozen other experts and exchange views and produce the volume *Discretion and Valour*.

I had a couple of motivations for wanting to engage in this project, one of which is to counter the widespread misapprehension in the West. Practically no one in Britain had any idea of what it is actually like to live in a totalitarian state, and therefore they had black and white views of the people who did live there. A personal example, my own dear mother, who was a lovely person, when Anneliese and I got engaged and my mother heard something of her story she said, "Well, if she got arrested she must have done something wrong". Oh, mother. Secondly, up until 1989 no reasonable person believed a word emanating from the German Democratic Republic. After 1989 they believed everything. This is deeply misleading. The Stasi archives are tainted by stupidity, cupidity and malice.

One simple example I can give is the attack made on Manfred Stolpe, the great, I would say saintly, general secretary of the East German Protestant Church through all those difficult years. When he stood for high office in the newly-united German Federal Republic, his opponents leaked material implying that he was a collaborator. One or two of us got together and in typically English fashion wrote a letter to the *Times* about that, but there are other things which need a wider hearing. I am very grateful to Dianne and the rest of you for setting up this hearing. I want the truth to come out. May I tell one little anecdote? There are two Russian newspapers, and there are two Russian words for truth. The Russian for truth is *pravda*, and the Russian for the news is *izvestia*. It was commonly said that in the *Truth* there is no news, and in the *News* there is no truth. Thatcher and Reagan made a terrible mistake in 1989 in thinking that people in Eastern Europe had risen up because they wanted Western consumerism and capitalism. Nothing could be further from the truth. They wanted the truth. They were fed up with being consistently lied to.

Kirby: Thank you. We are also very fortunate in being joined this afternoon by someone from East Germany, the Reverend Werner Kraetschell. Do you want to say anything at this point?

PO: Perhaps I could introduce Werner, because I am responsible for him being here. I've known Werner for many years, in fact in that crucial period when the Communist system was breaking down. He was a wonderful source of dispassionate analysis of what was happening, and was very largely used by the BBC at the time. He was dean of the East Berlin suburb of Pankow, which is where nearly all the Communist leaders lived. In fact, in the West it was often called the Pankow Republic.

In the East German churches there was a wide scale of response to the Communist system, ranging from outright opposition and rejection to almost total approbation. You got both extremes; they were not typical but they existed. Werner is one of the very few people to have been a brilliant diplomat in the best Christian sense of the word, and understood nearly every side of every issue. He was a real support in his official position at the heart of the Communist system, geographically. He supported groups that were real opposition groups, holding his hand over them and saying, "Over my dead body, you are not going to touch them". To do that, to have the capacity to save those who needed saving, he also had to be close to the Communist authorities. The most well known was the peace group in Pankow. Its Stasi file is one

of the most interesting you could imagine, and they were all considered very dangerous people. It is worth saying at this point that in East Germany the word "peace" was the Communist jargon for official policy. It was called our peace policy. The only way to form dissident groups was also to call yourselves a peace group. That was the one thing which they could not forbid, but the peace groups meant peace in exactly the opposite way to the government. They were both using it ideologically. The Pankow peace group was a profoundly dissident group, and without Werner it would not have survived. I think that is a good introduction to, simply, a Christian who still today lives in a street where nearly all his neighbours are former Communist officials, and they have remained his friends.

DK: Thank you. Now, down to some of the nitty-gritty of mixing scholarship with experience. Western archival sources show that Western secular policy makers, particularly in America, saw Christianity and the churches as natural allies and looked to mobilise their resources for political purposes, from anti-communist propaganda to actual acts of subversion, throughout the Soviet bloc. Archival research from the former Soviet bloc shows high levels of concern about the Western attempts to mobilise religion against the Communist regimes, as well as about its potential to destabilise and subvert. Soviet authorities in turn sought to use their churches and churchmen on their terms, as Paul has mentioned, particularly the peace movement, in response to what the West was doing. I wonder if you could discuss the extent to which you had a sense of being caught in the middle? Both sides were mobilising religion for political purposes. What did this do to the Christian agenda of unity?

Michael Bourdeaux: I don't recognise this as part of my experience. I think I was very much in the forefront of certain aspects of events from 1960 onwards, because I had the key to unlocking the truth of what was going on in the Soviet Union as far as religion was concerned. Very few people outside the country had that key. I can lay my heart bare and say that I was never once, at any point, approached by any government, with I think one exception. In Norway in about 1970 I was once asked to come and talk to the Norwegian Parliament about Cold War issues concerning the church. The work of the Keston Institute was never used as an implement of the Cold War. Indeed, most of the church leaders whom I met in this country were quite distanced from that, and did not think in terms of the church being an instrument against Communism.

I can quote you something which is slightly amusing, although it wasn't at the time. When I started publishing my findings in the mid-1960s word got to me that the Foreign Office took exception to what I was writing, and called the idea that there was persecution the "Bourdeaux view" of religion in Russia. It was widely not believed, even in government circles. It actually took until David Owen's day, a good ten years later in the mid-1970s, for that situation to change. From David Owen's day I was actually an adviser to the Foreign Office, but it took a very long time. I just do not see a pattern of Church leaders, the Archbishop of Canterbury and so on, and leaders of the Church in America and elsewhere, ganging up and fighting the Cold War battle against communism.

Kirby: John?

John Arnold: I would like to support what Michael has said. We had to think of three separate blocs. In the Soviet Union and its satellite states the churches were being instrumentalised, mainly in the cause of what was then called the peace policies of the Soviet Union, but also to spread the word about communism as a viable form of society. This was open and blatant, and we all understood it. For example, at meetings of the World Council of Churches, or the body with which I am more closely connected, the Conference of European Churches, churchmen from the East would tend to preface their remarks with what we called a passport speech. This was a declaration of loyalty which ensured they could return home safely and get a passport to come out again. This was quite transparent, and we lived with it as one of the rules of the game as it was being played in that period. Occasionally people overstepped the mark, and only discredited themselves.

There was a quite different phase in the United States of America. I do not know very much about it, but there I believe a combination of a kind of McCarthyite Catholicism and fundamentalist Protestantism did lead to what in theological terms is called a Manichean view of the world, seeing it as divided into black and white, the devilish and the godly. Some were even prepared to accept Armageddon if this would bring in the Rapture. This was not the case in Britain or in the British churches, which were our concern. They were perfectly alive to the nuances of the situation. Again, in my official position in the Church of England and in the British Council of Churches, I never came under any pressure from Foreign Office or Secret Service sources. I think if we can clear up this misapprehension, which may be around in the atmosphere, today will have been well spent.

PO: I think it is very important not to talk about the "Soviet bloc". That came out very clearly in the book we published, *Discretion and Valour*. The differences within what I always call the so-called socialist countries of Eastern Europe were considerable. In the context of their relationship with religion, you faced quite distinctly different situations. There were two countries where in relative terms the Church remained free. One was East Germany and the other was Poland. It is often not understood in the West that the Church here remained relatively free and relatively unpersecuted. That does not mean that Christians didn't have difficulties. But the Church within its own terms was a factor in national policy and had a degree of power. In the Polish context, that power became so great that in the end the Church became the great political power, and together with the trade unions then toppled the system, supported by the Polish Pope.

I can give you a graphic example of this. I visited a Polish village and it happened to be the Feast of St Peter and St Paul. I came into the village and it was completely empty, there was no one around. I said to my chauffeur, "Where are the people?". He replied, "It's the Feast of St Peter and St Paul, of course they are all in church". And so it turned out. When the service was over they spilled out into the street. I talked to the parish priest, and asked him, "Were all your people in church?". And he said, "Well of course, except for the mayor, who has my dispensation". In other words, the priest has power in the village, and that was reflected nationally.

In East Germany it was not as dramatic as that. The Church was always in difficulty, but for one thing West Germany was across the border, and everything that happened in East Germany was reflected in the West German media within twenty-four hours.

So the East German government was very restricted in what it could do. It wanted to have a good image, and being relatively kind to the Church was part of having a good image. In the latter period of the communist system, the Church began to have the sort of influence that it had in Poland. The Church became organised, had congresses where it openly discussed issues of freedom, produced documents of great importance and, above all, saw to it that violence should not and could not be part of the situation. The peaceful revolution, as people in East Germany call it, was very largely the product of the German Church's influence, which grew exponentially in the last two or three years. It was quite extraordinary. That history has been documented in a doctoral thesis by Stephen Brown, who has done a wonderful job of documenting the Church's political role in the collapse of communism.

DK: Werner, did you want to say something?

Werner Kraetschell: I ask for your understanding because of my poor English. I am not well trained in speaking English. I was born in 1940 in Berlin, and have very vivid memories of the hot war, not the Cold War. The bombing of Berlin was a trauma of my childhood, and I know what hot war was and is. Therefore I think that cold war is better than the hot war which was from '39 to '45. The meaning of the work of the churches behind the Iron Curtain was to bring into the cold atmosphere of the Cold War warm corners and rooms where you could touch or smell freedom. Therefore, my house in Berlin was always a meeting place of the opposition and of my friend Timothy Garton Ash. We had a lot of—[phone rings] Excuse me. That's Tim.

DK: I hope he mentions this in the *Guardian* and gives us all a plug.

WK: As you must know, my houses were bugged by the security service. I read later in my Stasi file that secret microphones were installed in the whole house. In special situations we used to work with our clients or members of the opposition or suffering people or those whom it was necessary to help because of the danger of suicide, to bring them from East to West. In my position in the Church I had this opportunity because of my friends. The Ambassador of West Germany is the godfather of my daughter, who called a moment ago. This man could help, as could Manfred Stolpe, to bring thousands of East Germans to the West, normally all from prison.

The East German situation was that our work in the spirit of reconciliation was to bring the warmth of the Gospel into this cold society and this bad ideology. You had to be very creative, as many of us were who made those rooms and spaces for freedom. In those spaces it was not only the Christian opposition that came together but also the communists, because within the communistic bloc you found what we called the noble communists, those who also suffered under Stalin and who had very oppositional thoughts and ideas within the ideology. Therefore, there was a close link and dialogue between those noble communists and Christians. The noble communists were always a kind of provocation or challenge for the Christian faith, because they invariably ask indirectly about your hope for the world and about your vision. The communists always talk about utopia, and therefore I think the communists are a very good challenge for our theology. The theology of East German pastors and churches is very influenced by Dietrich Bonhoeffer. It's wonderful to know that this is where the German church of Bonhoeffer was when he was in London.

PO: There is a plaque on this building to say so.

WK: This was the best preparation for our existence as theologians, that we had the chance to have a dialogue with the good side of the communistic dreams.

DK: I think this is probably a good point to bring in the factor of Christian-Marxist dialogue. Perhaps you could say something about that?

XD: I think we must make a clear distinction between Marxism and Marxism-Leninism, which was established in Russia. Lenin was influenced not only by Marxism but by Jacobinism within Russian political thought and the ideas of Tkachev. So different from the Mensheviks, who were closer to Marxism, he wanted to control everything with a small professional group at the top. Everything was controlled from above, it was nothing to do with decisions coming up from below or anything to do with democracy. So I think we do need to be quite clear that what was established in the Soviet Union had, to my mind, nothing to do with Marxism. I am not a Marxist theorist and I do not have that specialised knowledge, but I do know from my studies of the Soviet Union what Marxism-Leninism was about. It was really difficult for a Christian to have a dialogue with Marxism-Leninism.

I was thinking about the situation in the Soviet Union during the '60s and '70s until the rise of Gorbachev, and I can't imagine a situation where Christians could have a serious discussion with an idealist communist. I don't know whether Michael and John would agree. I am not sure that any such idealists existed in the Soviet Union by the 1960s. I think all the ideals of the early years had disappeared, and they used the ideology for their own survival and the preservation of their own positions. I don't know of any. For example, the Christian seminars set up by Alexander Ogorodnikov. I can't think of them having discussions with communists. They were under terrible pressure, and of course he was then put in prison and other members were put into prison psychiatric hospitals.

PO: As a political scientist, I say immediately that this is why I always refer to the so-called socialist countries.

XD: It had little to do with socialism.

PO: I never call them socialist; they were not. I totally agree with your analysis. But I would venture to say that they probably even existed within the system in Russia, although it was very hard in Russia to remain in the Party and not be murdered, if you were a communist dissident.

XD: Yes.

PO: It was very hard to survive in Russia after the terrible pogroms against communists as well as against Christians. But one thing I would like to comment on is, as Werner mentioned, the diplomacy at the highest level that John and I were involved with. There was a visit of the Archbishop of Canterbury, an official visit to East Germany. John has wonderfully told a story of that visit extensively, but just one bird's eye view. We sat round a large table with a British delegation led by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the then president of the Council of Ministers of East

Germany, a man called Stoph. As Werner said, Christians could provide warmth where there was just a cold society, and the Archbishop echoed this so wonderfully. The Communist politician made a classical speech. You knew what he was going to say before he said it, it was doctrinaire and straightforward and he constantly talked about peace. And when he had finished the Archbishop said, "Yes, we too want peace. But the peace you talk of is a very cold peace. We want a warm peace". Just to echo that, it was precisely what the Church was able to do, to create pockets of dialogue, not open resistance but people debating issues. The synods were the only places in East Germany that were democratically run, where you could have an election and all the hands didn't go up together. They debated with each other.

DK: John?

JA: John Arnold, Christian-Marxist dialogue. There is always a question about the compatibility of Christianity with Communism. Go back to Marx. Marx came from a long line of Lithuanian rabbis, and it is a little known fact that Marx was himself a Lutheran Christian and had been baptised. But I think that in his classical period, when he was writing his great works, he really was an atheist. His atheism comes from Feuerbach and his idea that religion is a projection. When in everyday discourse you hear people counting religion as a projection, that is Feuerbach reflected by Marx. Marx himself really was an atheist and so was Lenin, and so there is a genuinely aggressive, even militant, atheistic streak in communism.

However, Christians have often attempted to make some kind of rapprochement, and in the years after the Second World War some Marxists did too. There was a Marxist here, James Klugmann, with whom one could have rational discourses, and there is a Frenchman, Roger Garaudy. What was not possible was to have open Christian-Marxist debate in the Soviet Union or in its satellite states, wherever the party was in power. But in the West there were debates. However, at the moment in 1968 at which the Red Army marched in its hobnailed boots into the salons of Ptague, which was the best centre of Christian-Marxist dialogue, that dialogue came to an end.

MB: Yes. I could date to the day the time when Christian-Marxist dialogue began in the Soviet Union on an official level. Unofficially, it did exist in the prison camps, because that is where dissident communists and dissident Christians mingled and spoke openly and freely. Readers of Solzhenitsyn will know that there is more freedom within the prison camp system, the gulag, than anywhere else. Communism and Christianity finally began an open dialogue on 28 April 1988. This was the day on which Mikhail Gorbachev invited some of the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Kremlin for a reception. These are the words spoken by Gorbachev on that notable occasion: "Believers [religious believers] are Soviet people. They are workers and patriots, and they have the full right to express their convictions with dignity. Perestroika, democratisation and glasnost concern them as well in full measure and without any restrictions. This is especially true of ethics and morals, a domain where universal norms and customs are so helpful for our common cause."

XD: What was the date?

MB: That was the end of April 1988, and it was preparatory to the setting up of the celebration of the baptism of Prince Vladimir.

XD: The watershed when Communist Party policy in the Soviet Union completely changed towards religion.

MB: I often quote that passage in lectures, and I say that in a certain sense it was a shame that Gorbachev didn't last longer. It would have been very, very interesting to have seen the outworking of such a debate, although with hindsight it's obvious that Christianity was going to win hands down.

JA: Could I put in one sentence? I missed out the central stage in what I was saying about Marx's own thought. You can sum up Marx's religious position by saying that his doctrine is the doctrine of the social prophets of the faith of his fathers, Amos, Micah and Isaiah, without God. It is the social teachings of the great sixth century and eighth century prophets which is the faith of Marx. I think the Russian thinker Berdyaev was right in correcting a then-prevalent view that communism had nothing to do with religion by characterising it as a Judeo-Christian heresy. It has some elements of the religious tradition but, by missing the thirst for God, at the same time that it is thirsting for justice and righteousness, it goes wrong.

PO: At this point I think it is worth bringing in the great attempt, and the only large organised attempt, to create a framework for public Christian presence in Eastern Europe. That was the attempt by Professor Josef Hromádka, who at the Amsterdam Assembly of the World Council of Churches, the first WCC assembly after the war, was the great counterpart to John Foster Dulles in the American delegation, who was openly and frankly anti-communist. Hromádka said, "In the light of Christian history, and the degree to which the churches have been part of the oppression of the working classes, we have to rethink our position and humbly, within communist societies, work together with the system as far as we in conscience can". That led Hromádka and a group of other Christians, supported by a small minority of Christians from the West, to found the Christian Peace Conference in Prague.

The Russians were always present, as a powerful delegation led right from the start by—I deliberately say the great—Archbishop Nikodim of Leningrad. In a way, facing Nikodim I felt very inexperienced and young, until I realised that he was my age. A great Russian archbishop comes with all the nimbus that I didn't have as a young Anglican priest, and yet we were counterparts to each other. That first great assembly in Prague was in 1961, but it really reached its pinnacle in 1964, when there was a great confrontation between me and Nikodim. A resolution was put to the assembly which was so one-sidedly pro-Soviet that I got up and challenged it. I said that everything in that resolution was true but it was only half the truth and the other half is omitted, and therefore it became a lie. I said that I could never vote for a resolution of that kind. I had come there for dialogue, and not for propaganda purposes. Amazingly, I think possibly because Nikodim was also a good politician and realised that the mood of the assembly was perhaps against him, he got up and withdrew the motion. I know from background stories that he had to suffer for that. He was carpeted, as he sometimes was, but I got up in that assembly and embraced him and said, "We can differ and we can be brothers". But I had to pay for it.

When the next assembly came I continued in this vein, saying that we cannot be a one-sided conference with integrity. The next assembly was in May 1968, and prior to

that assembly the general secretary of the Christian Peace Conference, Josef Ondra, came to London to see me, and this shows you the kinds of pressures these Christians were under. He said, "This is a very bitter mission for me because we have become good friends, but I tell you this, if I cannot persuade you to resign from the executive committee of the Christian Peace Conference I will lose my job. I have been told to sack you, and if I don't succeed in that mission, it's me that's for the chop". So of course I went. I thought he was far too valuable a go-between to sacrifice him for my sake, so I resigned.

That was in May 1968, and in August 1968 pretty well all the senior people from the West also resigned in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The president of the Christian Peace Conference, Josef Hromádka, was totally heartbroken, and within three months he was dead. People said that he never recovered from this shock. In other words, it was a valiant attempt but it didn't work. The Soviet pressure became so great that by '68 the Christian Peace Conference had simply become a Christian mouthpiece of the World Peace Council, which was an international open Soviet support group. '68 was a watershed for those of us who still had a residual belief that genuine reform was possible in Eastern Europe, and of course the attempt of Gorbachev to prove that it was came too late. By that time the system itself was no longer viable, particularly economically, and the whole thing collapsed.

DK: Werner?

Werner Kraetschell: I want to add to and stress Paul's words by examples. You ask what the goal was of the churches in the Cold War. I can speak only for East Germany and for the conditions of life in this very poor German country, where we were imprisoned by a wall. We didn't set the pace; the task of the churches was to make room for freedom, for free discussion, for dialogue, in all levels of society. And we worked for the young people who came to us and who had a lot of profit from these spaces of freedom. It inspired them to make the wall come down. It was not our merit. We are not heroes, we were enablers, and that was the task of the church.

I would like to give some examples to illustrate the role of the churches and of our clergy. My friend was a leading figure, a Marxist communist, a noble communist. He was my brother-in-law, and we had a lot of contacts with other communists who were anti-communists in the power centres. He gave me a very new perspective. In my diocese I was the number one responsible for the relationship between the state and the territory of my diocese, twenty-four parishes and so on. My brother in law, Adolf Reisen, told me, "Dear Werner, you must imagine what your being in this world and sitting in front of a communistic functionary means for this man. He never had the impression of being a free man. He has to follow the party line. He is a functionary; he has to function here, and not think by himself. And therefore, you are bringing a miracle in his cold world. You are vivid, you are spontaneous, you are authentic, you don't ask for any line. And you must know that your influence is so strong you can't imagine it".

There was also the issue of the Stasi. You must know that my deputy was a collaborator. I had six collaborators who were trained and had to work against me. But you are always successful if you love people. You must love the communists'

good. That was my vow. Therefore, I made a visit on the holy night of '89, that famous year when the wall came down, to the successor of Erich Honecker, whose name is Egon Krenz. I had wonderful services in our Lutheran tradition and family. Every Christmas I want to go to a cold corner of this world to bring the warmth of the Gospel and of Christ's birth to any cold place. That year, I wanted to go to Egon Krenz, who lived not far from my church. I took a candle from the church service and went to him, and I didn't know if he would tell me to go away, or what his reaction would be. He was so happy that I came, and we had a long talk of three hours on that holy night, a kind of confession from a communist leader. It is my duty not to speak about what was in this discussion, but I was very interested in the communistic functionary who tells you, "Oh, my comrades, they do not come again, but my pastor comes. You must know that I was baptised and confirmed". Therefore you had a very new basis of hearing, and if there is some love of warmth in your way of acting, there is no enemy who is not impressed by this.

One last point, in 2005 in this spirit of love and understanding I invited the four leading generals and admirals of the West German army and the four leading generals and admirals of the East German army. The last Minister of Defence of East Germany, an admiral and a very interesting personality, told me, "I am very astonished that my comrade, an East German general, is a fellow churchman". On this night of free discussion one side, the East Germans, were able to speak Russian fluently, while the West Germans spoke English fluently, because of where they were educated. It was very interesting, and I was interested to show that these military people were very hopeful that the idea of non-violence could work, because in '89 in this famous month of November both sides were full of missiles and weapons that you can't even imagine. One soldier could have made the whole thing explode, and therefore it is a merit of these generals from both sides. They had never met before, it was the first contact, and there was a new task for the Church. There was a request from the East German generals to the West Germans, "You have punished us after the unification of Germany, and we get a salary close to the social support of the state. But our SS generals in the West and their families, they get the same money as the generals of your Western army. Is this just?".

There is a new way of loving, of making war, of helping. My last point concerns the peace group in my parish, under the roof of our church as in other churches in the western diocese. There the idea of non-violence was very practical. Because of my position the state officials in our district had no chance to hinder this peace group, this opposition group. But they decided to send to every public meeting about twenty young people from the communist schools, young men of the security high school. You could discover them very easily. Seventy per cent of this group were not members of the church, but I said that it is the work of the church and it is the tradition of these groups to sing songs. If this group of about ninety people in our parish house began to sing you could see that they were from the state, and if you asked, "What is your name?", you always got the name "Lutz", which is a German forename. So they got the nickname "Lutzies", and they always had a command from the Party to disturb our meetings, or make a revolution or protest. Therefore in every meeting it was a wonderful exercise to prove non-violence by yourself. You had to communicate with those strangers, people who were in a spirit of enmity. You had to work with them in a peaceful way, and you learned by yourself not to take violence. Therefore for ten years those groups in East Germany were trained in non-violence,

and this was a keyword of the success of the bringing down of the Berlin Wall. Candles against sticks and tanks.

DK: At this point I would like to open the floor for questions before we have a break. Does anyone have any questions for the panel on the areas we have addressed so far? Alright. We will have a short break and return in ten minutes.

Session 2

Dianne Kirby: Welcome back everyone. One of the inspirations, if you will, for this bringing together of scholars and activists, for want of a better word, was that John and I were discussing my work in the archives and his experience. As he pointed out, archives can be misleading unless you have people who actually lived through the events of the time to put their bit in as well. What I want to do at this point is go back to the archives, because one of the factors that is coming out on both sides is the role of the Vatican. John Paul II himself, very famously, after the end of the Cold War actually regretted the demise of the "noble communists" and the truths of Marxism. But if we go back to the early period, looking at Pius XII and his involvement, particularly with the Americans, it certainly did create a sense of anxiety throughout the Soviet Union, and subsequently the East European regimes, that there was a concerted attempt on the part of the West to use the churches. My own research here confirms what the panel were saying, which is that there were certainly attempts to resist and transcend cold war manipulation and divisions, certainly on the part of the ecumenical movement, and we also see the same with elements of the Catholic Church.

I think what is important here is that perceptions also matter. The evidence coming from the East European and Soviet archives is that they did believe that there was a movement against them, and that religion was dangerous, that it was a conduit for subversion. So for instance, although there has been an assumption that the Soviets responded favourably to Pope John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council, new scholarship shows that in fact the Soviets thought it was only a tactical shift in the efforts to battle communism. Interestingly, they saw links with the World Council of Churches as a means to fend off the Vatican threat to the Russian Orthodox Church, because of course the Russian Orthodox Church was also important in developing inter-Orthodox links. So there was this fear, and I wonder if you could address the fact that it must have had some impact, and have made some problems for what you were trying to do. As Paul pointed out while we were discussing these issues during the break, you all had massive Stasi files, and you seem to have been objects of suspicion. And, as was mentioned earlier, certainly Keston worried the Soviet authorities tremendously. Could we address that aspect, this fear and the extent to which it complicated the Christian witness, if you will?

PO: I think what you have just said is absolutely true. I believe that from the moment of the October Revolution in Russia the Soviet system was on the defensive, and at heart it never changed. It knew of its own economic weakness throughout, and it was terribly afraid of the capitalist West. Their protestations about peace were indeed propaganda, but they were also true. They were genuinely afraid, and many Soviet

policies, particularly those towards religion, were based on the assumption that religion was not a private matter of a person's beliefs but a power structure, symbolised by the Vatican, that was out to destroy them. The evidence suggests that many people within the Vatican framework saw it that way themselves. They did use crusading language, that there was a great crusade on. It was a crusade of god against atheism, and I think fear was a huge motivation in the whole of the Soviet structures. This of course meant that they had to almost kill their own economy by spending on military power to fend off the West. This was deeply ingrained, this idea that Britain, France and so on actually tried to invade the Soviet Union and destroy the revolution right from the moment it broke out. They never lost this deep feeling of the world being against them, and there was sufficient truth in that to make the fear real. People who are afraid also become aggressive, so there was also the aggressive element in Soviet communism, although I don't think military conquest was ever part of their plan. I gather from historians that Soviet documents tend to prove this.

For example, the offer of Stalin to re-unify Germany and give up East Germany as a communist state, and let a unified, neutral Germany exist outside the communist sphere, was rejected by the West as a piece of communist propaganda and never taken seriously. The Soviet documents prove that Stalin was perfectly prepared to do that, in other words an Austrian solution to the whole of Germany, so that the whole situation with the Wall and all that would have been quite unnecessary.

That element is part of the Cold War history and the Church is only one factor in it, but I think psychologically the language of crusading hit home, and communists were afraid. Certainly, the Soviets did not have inner self-assurance. I think they had become cynics, and this is borne out by what Xenia said. They did not believe in the Marxist view of history that said they were inevitably going to win. They had lost that faith; they mouthed it but didn't believe it. That came graphically home to me in a conversation over lunch with Oleg Gordievsky, the Soviet head of the KGB in London, who turned out to be a double agent and was working for Western intelligence at the same time, and who then came to live in Britain and wrote books and all sorts of things. But then I thought he was just an ordinary Russian diplomat with whom I had dealings as international secretary of the British Council of Churches. In the middle of the meal he said to me, "Do you know the difference between us Russians and the Americans?", and I said, "Tell me, Oleg". He said, "The Americans believe in their own propaganda". Very subtle joke, but it was true.

DK: Could we take a question from the floor?

John Pollard: This is not really a question, more a comment, trying to illuminate some of the things which Paul Ostreicher has just said. The Vatican's attitude towards the Soviet Union evolved over time, and it evolved quite dramatically. The interesting thing is that after the revolution the Vatican was convinced that this was the moment for the conversion of Russia. It was convinced that it could do business with the Bolshevik government; extraordinary, with the hindsight of history, but it is true. But of course, what the Vatican had forgotten was that the Catholic Church in Russia, apart from being very, very small, very marginal, was hopelessly associated and tainted by its relationship with Poland. Indeed, many of the clergy and bishops of the Catholic Church in Russia were Polish. They were always going to be in a very dangerous position, particularly after the defeat of the Red Army in front of Warsaw.

The other point I wanted to make was that sometimes we actually do need to take Soviet ideology and Soviet propaganda at its face value. When I look at what happened to the Catholic Church—I am only looking at the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe and the countries that were overrun by the Red Army and then sovietised—it is very clear to me that the communists were quite right to see the Catholic Church as a very dangerous institution, simply because it was an institution. It was deeply imbedded in the society of those countries in all sorts of different ways. It had huge demographic and economic but above all institutional and legal strength. For sovietisation to succeed after 1945 in those countries and for the revolution to be carried out, and let's be very clear that that is what they were after, an institution like the Catholic Church had to be eliminated, or at least cut heavily down to size. Whatever speculation we may make about the efficacy of godless atheism as a policy and the extent to which it was truly believed in by the Soviet elite, the fact was that the Catholic Church in particular but other Churches also were an impediment to Sovietisation after 1945.

John Arnold: Paul was kind enough to invite me to a meal with Oleg Gordievsky, because Gordievsky wanted to talk about the Christian faith and he needed interlocutors. In the middle of a very interesting, very profound Dostoyevskian conversation, somebody came uninvited from the Soviet embassy with a supposedly-visiting professor to join in the conversation, and Gordievsky just got up and left. Do you remember that? It was a very interesting example of how seriously they took religion, compared with the neglect and scorn which we sometimes experienced from our own politicians. Marxism took Christianity much more seriously than capitalism has ever done.

I want to look back at a nuanced slight disagreement with Paul, which is perhaps along John Pollard's line. I think that the communist threat had some elements of reality in it, and was not just a myth or a creation of Western propaganda, and it had three levels. The first is that I think there is an irreducible element of messianism in communists, it's a quasi-religious ideology which was going not only to conquer but to save the world. That was there in the hearts and minds of the old communists we met, not the apparatchiks who were left by the end. That was real, and it was exacerbated by the elation of victory in 1945, the astonishing achievement of the last three years, when the Russians who had been beaten to their knees destroyed the best army that the world had ever seen. No wonder there was an element of jubilation, bringing the jubilee into Eastern Europe where they did impose their political system, against the will of the people. I think that was the reality at that level, at the military level.

The time when I first got involved in this in an individual way was one of crazy days, they were surrealist. We were only idealistic students, but at the same time I was an officer on the reserve. And we knew the disposition of the Red Army. I knew much more about the Red Army than I knew about the British Army. We knew that they had the tactical superiority of more than two to one, in every arm on the ground. It was just the reality for any NATO general to take into account. Even if they weren't necessarily going to use it, the deterrent effect was very strong. Also politically, at any moment Italy might have voted democratically to become a communist state. If it hadn't been for the combination of the Vatican and the CIA propping up a corrupt

CDU, Italy would have been a communist country. The Greek civil war would have broken out again, possibly the civil war in Spain would have been revived, even France. There was a real possibility of communism coming to power, as it did in Czechoslovakia. The spirit of what happened in Czechoslovakia, of communists coming to power by democratic means, haunted us in those days. Maybe that has been forgotten. I wanted to revive that memory. Behind that, the other factor, which Professor Pollard has reminded me to bring in, is that of course for us the great split from Trieste to Danzig, the Iron Curtain and the division of Europe into two halves was very significant. We lived and worked with the Wall and the overcoming of the Iron Curtain for decades.

Behind that, going back to the division of the Roman Empire under Diocletian, is the split between the Orthodox East and the Roman Catholic West, which is culturally and religiously and profoundly humanly much deeper. Political divisions of the twentieth century are superficial cracks compared with the rift between Orthodox East and Catholic West, which some of us have spent our lives working on. We haven't made very much progress, but that is there underneath quite a lot of political and military events.

In 1989 those of us who had been working and praying for the Wall to come down thought the golden age of ecumenism had come. We thought that we would be free to travel, we could meet our friends, we could have discussions and it will solve all our problems. Thinking this was the biggest mistake of my life, because exactly the opposite happened. The moment that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly the South East, the Balkans, emerged from under the tide of common misery of imposed communism, the age-old religious and ethnic animosities broke out. Hot war returned to the European continent, in Yugoslavia for the first time since 1945. Put yourself in the position of a Serb Orthodox, seeing a newly independent Croatia recognised on the first day by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Vatican, but not by any other state. The nightmare for the Orthodox has always been a Croatian wave of triumphalist Catholicism into what they regard as their religious territory. I hope I am not being hysterical about this.

John Pollard: I don't think you are.

John Arnold: These are elements which are scarcely known or understood in the West and by Western Protestants.

John Pollard: I agree with every word of that, no quarrel. Just very quickly, the intersection of the dispute between Latin Christianity and Orthodoxy and the dispute between East and West in the Cold War is very important. I think it is one of the keys to understanding the Cold War. Some years ago I wrote a biography of Pope Benedict XV, who was Pope between 1914 and 1922. I found documents which demonstrated that the Vatican, which had in all other ways sought to preserve a position of neutrality and impartiality and so on, was desperate in 1916 because it thought the Russian armies would get to Constantinople. This was of course a nightmare scenario of revivified Orthodoxy on the Bosporus, which was a real terror. I think in a way this has not entirely gone away, even today.

DK: I have two questions from the floor.

Serafim Florea: I have two points which I would like to mention. One is the term genocide, which I haven't heard at all, which I am going to put forward for the panel to discuss. The second is the development of Christianity along with nationalism. I think that is what makes it very difficult for ecumenism to travel. From the beginning, after a very few centuries of development, Christianity started developing along nationalistic lines. Therefore when we speak about Christianity, Serbs have their own view of what it is to be a Christian, Russians have their own view and the English have their own view. We lack understanding that Christianity is actually a universal concept, and it has been so much polluted by our denominations—Catholic, Orthodox, or otherwise—that we find ourselves at present in disputes. We struggle mainly because of our national boundaries or cultural limits.

I think that Christianity, or everything that we discuss about Christianity, should very much be approached through the universal view, which is very certain that to be a Christian is to follow the Gospels, and that satisfies it. It is not to follow the corporate rules of a particular institution. The way I see the Church as missing out during the Cold War is that it became basically a type of corporation, as some churches still are. It treated its followers or worshippers, people who came to church and participated in church life, as a kind of clientele or customer. The customer consumes sacred things, icons, liturgies, masses, books and so on, but it rather misses the point of a connection, of being part of an enduring Christianity, an active Christianity where you are there in the field, not discriminating but helping your neighbour to come to the right path, or rather a kind of harmony between your life and their life.

My first proposal is for the panel to approach how nationalism and Christianity have prevented ecumenical union during the post-Cold War period, and the second one is to approach how even the so-called nationalist views, which I can't call Christian views, motivated genocides. On the other side the atheism of the Soviet Union led to genocides. During the Soviet Union the greatest genocide of all happened, and that was not against the Jews but against Christian peasants. That is what I would like to hear more about.

DK: Werner, would you like to respond to that?

Werner Kraetschell: The influence of the Vatican in Europe is dependent on the relationship of Protestants and Roman Catholics. To bring an example, in the former West Germany the relationship is 1 to 1, 50% Protestants and 50% Roman Catholics. In East Germany the ratio was 1 to 7, one Roman Catholic to seven Protestants. That meant the political responsibility of the churches for society, for Christians, for value systems and so on, was the task of the Protestants because they were the majority. The minority of the Roman Catholics were very still. There is a joke, that you couldn't see that the carton had any movement. They were careful, they were interested in the number not decreasing, being careful, and not making political sentences and so on. There was no influence of the Roman Catholic Church, and so on. Therefore, you can learn from this experience.

This Church is responsible for the political way of acting in a nation or in a country where it is in the majority. In East Germany, Bavaria or Poland, the Roman Catholic Church was the institution which had to work in this way. Therefore you can compare

the old West German republic, which was a Roman Catholic republic. It was a very Catholic atmosphere, close to France and to the Vatican, and the influence was very high under Adenauer. When they changed to Berlin, at the top of the united German state today the president is a pastor, a Protestant, and the Prime Minister is more powerful than he. I knew her as a schoolgirl, when I was a pastor for the first time. Her father was my colleague and her mother was my English teacher, and I knew Angela from her childhood. The type of mixture I tried to describe, to bring about the task of our Church in East Germany, produced the mentality which is very fit to lead the united Germany. You can read it in the first positions, and there are more than these two who came from a vicarage and who are very influential in the modern united Germany. Therefore I want to say that the influence of the Vatican and the Roman Catholic Church depends very often on the majority profession in European countries.

John Arnold: To come back to the point about genocide, genocides have overwhelmingly been committed not by religions but by ideologists in Europe, especially by paganism in its fascist form and by atheism in its communist form. Regrettably, there have been appalling genocides of Christians by Christians, but these occurred either before the Cold War or after. I cannot think of any instance of intra-Christian conflict during the Cold War period. This is very interesting, because it gives some credence to the communist claim that it was the Pax Sovietica which stopped Christians from killing each other. That's greatly to our shame.

I was president of the Conference of European Churches and had the care of all the churches throughout Europe, and I remember that when trouble broke out in Ireland it made very great difficulties for our member churches in Central and Eastern Europe. This was precisely because the communist authorities were saying, "Look there, without us to keep the lid on this is what Christians do to each other". It is an everlasting shame and scandal to us in the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

PO: Apropos of that, I gave a lecture at Queen's University in Ireland, where I said that what you in Ireland need is a Tito. You need someone who is neither a Catholic nor a Protestant but someone from outside to rule you and stop you killing each other.

John Arnold: Yes. It is not accidental that Tito was a Croat, it is providential.

PO: May I slightly change the topic here and look at the question of the churches' relationship with the human rights movement? This is of course a development that came out of the post-war United Nations declaration of human rights, Eleanor Roosevelt and all that, which became—thank God, I say—a major factor in post-war history. When we go back in Christian history, the Christian record of human rights is abysmal. The churches did not like the concept at all, and were much happier in an authoritarian state that dictated what your religion should be. So change took place here to the extent that human rights became an international responsibility, and of course, as so often happens, the Church had to learn from the world and get on board. The World Council of Churches was part of all that, but it was part of it in a very, very difficult situation.

The World Council of Churches would like to have been a beacon of human rights, but in the Cold War context that we are talking about, it wasn't. This is where Keston comes in. Thank God that there are institutions like Keston, which was not the only one, with a single-minded policy of speaking for the persecuted of the communist world. There had to be such an institution, and Michael is one of the people who created it. But world Christendom, trying to operate on a world stage, found itself in a very difficult situation. I was torn in that situation. I actually became chairman of the British section of Amnesty International in the '70s. I was once a Jewish refugee child and to me human rights were fundamental, from my own experience but also my reading of the Gospel.

As a diplomat dealing with Eastern Europe, I was torn. If I had taken what I respect as the necessary line, the Keston line of fighting a battle against the persecution of Christians, my role as a Church diplomat would have become virtually impossible. Perhaps I was playing a double game. I was typical of the wider Church, playing a double game. The churches of Eastern Europe, with the exception of the Poles and the East Germans, were totally under the control of their communist governments. You could not be a bishop in Hungary or Czechoslovakia without a state license, and the state also paid your salary. These churches were totally controlled, and this is extremely true of the Russian Orthodox Church. Inasmuch as it was able to operate publicly, it could only operate under a state license. Nobody could ever become a bishop without the KGB approving of that bishop, who would also have to work for the KGB in order to be a bishop. These people were members of the World Council of Churches. What do you do? If people speak the truth publicly they have to leave the Word Council of Churches, and they would have to leave the ecumenical union. They would not have been able to join in Delhi, or if the World Council of Churches had spoken the way Keston speaks, it would have had to go.

The best that the World Council of Churches could do was behind the scenes, to bring some subtle pressures and have some conversations. To do what I did when I went to the Soviet Union, I actually visited dissidents until the point came when they refused to give me a visa, which in a sense stopped me doing my job. You were hung up on a real and genuine dilemma. Do you in a sense still support those churches even though they have been, necessarily, to survive, corrupted? Frankly, those bishops in countries such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as far as I was concerned they were scoundrels. I could not discover the Gospel in what they were doing. And yet they still enabled the Christian community to go on living. They still enabled even those who disagreed with them to function. They had a role which, ethically, you could only say that God's grace and forgiveness is great enough to include them, even them. I had to deal with them as human beings, I had to try. I found it very hard to love them.

There was a huge dilemma for the churches in the Cold War, and the single-minded speakers for the persecuted were a necessary part of the whole Church scene. That is why I always had enormous respect for Keston College, even when the day came when I said that I actually shouldn't sit on its board any more, because it was not compatible with the job I was trying to do. That kind of inattention was in myself, and it was in the churches. I heard Philip Potter, who was the general secretary of the WCC at that time, talk about this. He found it intensely painful. To be able to campaign against apartheid in South Africa, as he did very effectively—the WCC became virtually the head of the anti-apartheid movement in Europe—and yet not to

do anything comparable about Eastern Europe, he found that very painful. But the difference was that the South African churches asked for that criticism, actually begged the world to boycott South Africa, and often went to prison for it. Many of them were killed, but they held out. That did not happen, publicly, for the Church in these communist countries, and one had to live with the reality.

XD: But it surely happened in 1975, when the World Council put on the agenda the question of the persecuted Church in the Soviet Union and other communist countries. It was raised by Father Gleb Yakunin.

PO: I was exaggerating. In other words there came a point when that tension made the World Council realise that we can't let this one go.

XD: We have to bear in mind that all the official representatives of the Church didn't necessarily represent their churches entirely. There were many other points of view, and there were many parts of the Russian Orthodox Church that didn't accept them, even those who were officially bishops. There was the Furov report, I think it was, which distinguished between those who were reliable, those who were fairly reliable, and those who were unreliable. So there were definitely a number of bishops who did not agree with their Church's policies.

MB: I accept what Paul was saying about the difficulty of standing in the middle, and the impossible role that Church diplomats were supposed to fulfil. What I find very hard or perhaps impossible to accept is the degree of personal hostility which was generated within the World Council of Churches. That doesn't apply at all to the British Council of Churches. As you know, it has been said today that I attended meetings there for twenty-four years, from 1965 until the dissolution of the East-West Relations Committee. We had arguments and so on, but never was there a falling out to the degree that daggers were drawn, or I would withdraw or anything like that. There was good, healthy debate, which very often I lost, but I didn't withdraw.

However, looking outside the UK, there was immense hostility, and I mean hostility. I felt it nearly every day of my working life, and it was extremely painful. It came from various people on the World Council of Churches' staff, I can't remember all their names now. It came very especially from the National Council of Churches in New York, which we have not mentioned this afternoon. It came very strongly, and I think way beyond the call of duty and the necessity to give passport speeches, from senior officials of the Russian Orthodox Church. It did not need to. For having defended the persecuted Orthodox Church and others during those years, the hostility engendered maintains itself today. I feel that extremely painfully. I was talking to one of the senior bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church a few years ago, and he said "Michael Bourdeaux, you have a bad image". He spoke in Russian, but he used the English word "image" rather than the Russian word he might have used.

XD: образ [obraz].

MB: That is to me something which has no place in ecumenical relations. It's a subject of great sadness to me that this persists even today. I could go on for some length, but I think I've made my point. There is one other thing I want to say. That personal hostility was extended to heroes of the ecumenical movement in the Soviet

Union, who were themselves supressed. Xenia mentioned the name of Father Gleb Yakunin, one of the greatest figures in the ecumenical movement in the twentieth century, but he was not allowed to be in any sense an official part of the ecumenical movement. He set up a—

XD: A committee for the defence of believers' rights.

MB: A committee for the defence of believers' rights, and for that he was blackballed by his own Church and by the World Council of Churches. When he was imprisoned, I have it on documented record that the World Council of Churches international group, I forget the name—

PO: The CCIA, the Churches' Commission on International Affairs. Not the CIA!

MB: That's right. When Father Gleb Yakunin was in prison they said, "Who is this man? We have not heard of him, he does not represent the Russian Church". That of course had been dictated to them by Russian diplomats in Geneva, it had been dictated by the KGB.

John Arnold: Thank you so much, Michael, for sharing that with us. I have to lift you from the level of something so personal and existential just to make the point that we should make a distinction between religious liberty in particular and human rights in general. At the beginning of the period the World Council of Churches had a secretariat for religious liberty. Interestingly enough this is pre-Vatican Two, and therefore its main concern was the protection of Protestants in Spain, Portugal and Columbia from their fellow Christians. With Vatican Two came great blessings, religious liberty and so on, the opening of the ecumenical movement by the Catholic Church. That department fell victim to cost-cutting just when it could have come in useful, because it was just at the time when the Russian Orthodox Church and the Churches of the other Eastern bloc nations were coming into the World Council of Churches, and there was then a significant change in the nature of the institution. It went with a shift from focusing on religious liberty to the wider concern for human rights, and that relativizes the question of religious liberty. I found that very painful, because I was working quite a lot for the World Council of Churches then, and wanted to keep a focus on persecution in Eastern Europe. This was getting dissipated with the turning towards the issues of the third world, especially the struggle against apartheid, in which the World Council of Churches played a very honourable role.

At that level, the level of structures, towards the end of the Cold War period the churches, particularly through the Conference of European Churches, again played a very honourable role in the negotiations which produced the Helsinki Accords, in particular Basket III, which secured some easements in the field of human rights and religious liberty. The Conference of European Churches was the only body which maintained a pair of observers, one from the East and one from the West, at every session. That is a very remarkable achievement.

PO: At every what?

John Arnold: At every session of the discussions on Basket III. Although that is bureaucratic and institutional and so on, it is a very remarkable achievement of

institutional religion, which could only be done by a structured body like that. If like Edith Piaf we ask ourselves at the end of a long life if we have any regrets, I think we and everyone of all faiths can't say *je ne regrette rien*. This is because of our close association with so much misery and, I think, not just persecution but the daily humiliation that people lived with all those years. Our regret is that we couldn't personally do more to help the oppressed, the humiliated, the injured, and the distanced. We did what we could, and to be fair to the staff of the ecumenical bodies of churches, on visits people were doing a very great deal of good by stealth. Our late lamented colleague, Father Sergei Hackel, was the best at this, but we all did what we could. Not just taking medicines and fresh fruit and Bibles, but the key thing that we took to people was the knowledge that they hadn't been abandoned. The nightmare for people we saw was the feeling that they had been forgotten.

Christianity cannot accept any externally imposed limits to its own faith. And that's what motivated us all, but we all end up saying that we didn't do as much as we wanted to, perhaps we didn't do as much as we could. The lesson that we learned was that effective action is scarcely possible without the active involvement of the local church. If you are not supported by the local church on the ground it is very difficult to help the individuals or the small groups or the families who you want to help. The situation was so different in South Africa, in Nicaragua. There were no other comparable situations in Europe, but the message to take away is that if you come in from outside, you have to have local support as well. And that is the relationship between locality and universality, which is the meaning of the word catholicity.

DK: I've got two questions now from the floor.

Judith Rowbotham: I suggest that one of reasons why there has been less difficulty with Nicaragua and South Africa is the fact that the Christian mission there stems from a very long period of Western European colonisation, and that therefore there is not the problem that you yourself identified. One of the things I found myself doing when I worked at the School of Oriental and African Studies was working with a young woman who was doing her PhD on Lebanon. As a result of that I went out to Lebanon. I was about the first person who wasn't an archaeologist, who was an academic, out there at the end of their civil war. My university threw an absolute hissy fit about my going there.

One of the things that most struck home, which I had not picked up even though it was there in my student's thesis, was the resentment, the complication between Western Christianity, which includes Protestants, and Eastern Christianity. Of course, part of the problem is that you will often hear that the issue in Lebanon is between Christianity and Islam; it is not. As much as anything else there is huge conflict between Greek Orthodoxy and the Maronites, because the Maronites are Catholic, thank you very much. As a historian, one of the things I am most conscious of from that PhD student and from my other work on the history of foreign missions is the extent to which culturally engrained attitudes, which are not directly religious but are engendered by religion, have affected these relationships. They have affected the problems that you're talking about with the attempts to create an ecumenical dialogue with Eastern Europe, which goes back to Serafim's point about the connexion between national identity and the Churches, absolutely.

PO: I'd like to make one very personal point, and to me it's a theological point, and what is behind my accepting the chairmanship of Amnesty International in the UK. This is quite subjective, but I was always much more concerned about the situations where Christians are the persecutors than situations where Christians are the persecuted. The Gospel actually says in the Beatitudes, "Blessed are you when you are persecuted for my sake". It's a blessed condition, I would almost say a natural condition, for Christians to be persecuted. They ought to be against establishments, they ought to be working for the Kingdom. But when Christians become the persecutors I get much more worried.

DK: Philip?

Philip Walters: I just wanted to make a few observations about themes that have come up, and then ask a couple more general questions about the project. You started off, Dianne, by posing the question of whether Churches were "used" by political sides for their own purposes. Not so much used, perhaps, as were instrumentalised willy-nilly. The problem, or one of the main problems, is basically one of ideology affecting discourse, what it is possible to say and what meaning is placed on what you say. This may be a legacy which has yet to be worked through by the Church and Church-related institutions.

We've heard the word "peace" used. I remember that during my time at Keston peace was a word which was particularly problematic. It seemed to me to be either absence of violence or the quest for human rights, the rights of individuals. A polarisation occurred, and it was not possible to be concerned with both at the same time in any meaningful sense in the eyes of the world because of the ideological context in which we were working. The Church was playing a double game willy-nilly, and I wonder if this was a good thing for the churches, whether it was a healthy thing or a bad thing in the long term. These are the basic questions which I think we should bear in mind, specifically about the programme to combat racism and the World Council of Churches. I remember on one occasion speaking to a World Council of Churches representative and asking him, "Why can you not set up a programme to combat religious discrimination?" I thought he was rather uncomfortable, and his answer was quite evasive, saying that it would be too sensitive or too controversial. I thought that was not really an adequate answer.

The question of churches being forced to play a double game in an ideological context leads me to wonder about the Cold War period. Was it a unique period in history? It's a bi-polarity fuelled by ideology, and what is the place therefore of faith, of religion? The second point, which we haven't really touched on but was in Dianne's introductory paper, was that this was a world-wide project, and of course the Cold War was a world-wide phenomenon. It involved not just Europe but Africa, South-East Asia and South America, and there were ramifications all over the world. I argued when I was at Keston that totalitarianism of that kind was possible only in the two middle quarters of the twentieth century, about 1925 to about 1975 or 1980, when you had sufficiently developed communications and media for control, but not sufficiently developed communications and media for people to be able to take power into their own hands. I think one of the things to bear in mind in this project is how unique this period was, and the context of the legacy it has left for the churches.

It seems to me that we have now moved away from that polarised ideological world to one of liquid modernity, where people are communicating on all levels with each other in different ways. People such as Francis Fukuyama are arguing that we now have a mono-polarity and the end of history, no polarities, and people such as Samuel Huntingdon argue that the world is now divided into many different polarities, to do with culture, religion and other things. I was quite interested recently by a 2003 bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church, Hilarion Alfeyev, who is now the head of the external relations department, succeeding Kirill, who is now the Patriarch. He noted that after the Second World War the hitherto traditional multi-polar world gave way to a bi-polar world, in which liberal democracy was set against communism. He then argues that since the end of communism the world has become multi-polar again. This, in his view, gives an opportunity now for Churches such as the Russian Orthodox Church to look into their own heritage of interpretations, specifically of issues such as human and religious rights, and actually to feed in some of their theological insights into this debate in a way which is no longer determined by ideological considerations which have nothing much to do with the Gospel.

I see a certain amount of development now at the level of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights. We see representatives of Orthodox countries which are now becoming part of the European Union, feeding in an Orthodox perspective, not in a spirit of confrontation or bi-polarity, but in a spirit of trying to modify what they see as the biased legacy of Western European secularism on issues such as religious freedom. They put more stress on communal rights as opposed to simply individual rights. So my basic point is that I think we should consider this Cold War context in the global framework, but also consider how unique an experience it was.

DK: I'll let these two respond, and then come back.

John Arnold: I usually find myself in deep disagreement with Metropolitan Hilarion, so it is a pleasure to have an opportunity to agree with him. I disagree with him because of his illiberalism, his misunderstanding of Western European enlightenment, and his reversion to Byzantine centralism and Orthodox triumphalism, but I agree with him that the period of the great totalitarian states and ideologies was unique in history. That is always a dangerous thing to say. I say it for different reasons, including the admirable one which Philip mentioned of the technology of communications. It has sometimes been said that the ecumenical movement could only occur after the invention of cheap air travel and before the world runs out of petrol.

We've lived in a unique age of ecumenism, and the reason for that is to do with the word "ideology". It is customary to speak about religions and ideologies being open to all faiths, but that is newspeak for communism. There has only ever been one ideology in the history of human thought, and that is communism. Fascism wasn't an ideology, it was a ragbag of ideas. It was precisely the nature of communism which made the Cold War period unique. You used an expression early on, Philip, about ideology affecting discourse. I found that very interesting indeed. One of the extraordinary features of the life of the Churches in the Cold War period, that is the '45 to '89 period, is that there is no single example of a Church developing syncretistic doctrines by amalgamating with Marxism. This is a very important

contrast with the Deutsche Christen of the fascist period which immediately preceded it, where the attempt was made to syncretise old German patriotism and crazy racist ideas with Christianity. It was soon discredited, and it is off the map. But nothing like this ever happened with communism, and that is very remarkable.

DK: What about Liberation Theology?

John Arnold: I am talking about Churches in Europe in the Cold War period, and trying to test my thesis by coming up with an example against it. The only example I know of was the adoption by Hungarian Lutherans led by a single very powerful bishop of what was called a theology of service. This enabled Bishop Kaldy to take hold of the great and honourable Christian idea of service, that had been an essential part of Christianity since the very beginning, as it were in order to put his Church at the service of the Hungarian state, and that I am sure hasn't persisted. As I say, the remarkable thing is that all the Churches, Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant, preserved their doctrine.

PO: A brief response to John. I think John's wrong. I think the bi-polarity situation with communism in the West was by no means unique. The period of the Thirty Years War and what the Reformation did to a Catholic Europe were extraordinarily similar, and much more violent. Against my own principles I would say that probably UK weapons saved us from violence, but there have been periods in history like the Cold War. I don't think it was unique, not on that point. I think John needs some history homework.

John Arnold: I'm so happy we've established the real dissensus.

Werner: We have said much on the influence of ideology in the communistic world behind the Iron Curtain. I want to say something about the influence of ideology in the Western world, because the difference is that in the Western world this crusade of language and thinking was internalised by everyone. To give an example, in the midst of the Cold War in 1983, a delegation of forty Americans came to East Berlin to have contact with some Christians behind the Iron Curtain. They passed the border in this inhuman way in Berlin, and were very irritated because they were prejudiced; that is the food of ideology.

PO: They were prejudiced.

Werner: The prejudice was the idea that the Russians had shot our Christians in the woods. We had to meet in the *Kanäle* of Berlin—

XD: In the sewers.

Werner: But the reality was that my colleague, a young priest, had a wonderful courageous summit. The conditions of life, they were so irritated, because they—

PO: Their prejudices were complete destroyed.

Werner: They asked me to come to America to talk about the situation of Christianity behind the Iron Curtain. It was a miracle that I got permission from the GDR to go to

America in 1984. I asked my friends, the Americans influenced by the idea of the free world, to give me the chance to have contact with peace groups in America. In my ideological world, I always heard from the state secretary and from propaganda and ideology that the peace movement is financed by Moscow. I came to America and asked to be given a chance. They brought me to a peace movement meeting in America, and I discovered two things. I found that the idea that this group was financed by Moscow to be Cold War ideology, and that the members had grey hair. This was different from my group of young people, who were so courageous to risk losing their jobs. But in America the propaganda was so strong that only elderly people took the risk and had the courage to join these groups, not the young people because they feared to lose their jobs. Therefore I was so interested in your contribution, Philip, because your question is the key question. What can we learn from this period of Cold War? I think the task of the churches is to pull off the masks of ideology. I think today we live in ideologies so long we live on this earth, but the task of the churches is to pull off the masks and encourage the people to look for the truth and not believe the propaganda.

DK: We have three or four questions now.

Maria Peliaoto (London Met): We've moved on from what I wanted to bring up, but there were obviously different levels of church suppression during the Cold War period. John spoke about how the World Council of Churches didn't want to make people in these countries feel abandoned, they wanted local support to combat the daily humiliation. My research area is Albania, and I'd like to ask the panel about the view of the World Council of Churches and the ecumenical movement in general on Albania. As we know, in 1967 God was abolished in Albania. It was the first atheist state. Obviously you couldn't get local support, that wasn't possible. You were talking about your experiences in Eastern Europe where you had a team of people coming in, but that wasn't possible, you'd have ended up in the gulags. Obviously there were different levels of suppression of the churches during the Cold War.

My second point concerns the discussion about the Orthodox Church, and you brought out the links with nationalism. I'm Orthodox myself, and I think that the history of the Orthodox Church is completely different to Western Europe. They were under the Ottomans, so the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, all these things just passed them by. It was the ark of preserving the national identity of the Church during the dark years of Ottoman rule, so the system was completely different and the role of the clergy was completely different, thus the involvement in politics. Good or bad is another story. Obviously they were recognised; the Ethnarch was the leader of the flock, and was recognised as leader by the Ottomans. Under the Minette system there was a direct link with the Ethnarch, so that's what I wanted to say. I really wanted the panel's view, because it would be interesting to see how Albania was treated in your meetings.

John Arnold: I can say a little about that. Albania was really a blank spot on the map. I spent years representing the Conference of European Churches in saying that we have 126 member churches in every country in Europe, except Albania.

XD: For Keston as well.

John Arnold: "Except Albania" was on the end of every sentence. It was impenetrable. There may have been those who penetrated, but not to my knowledge. We knew nothing about what was going on. It was the first, and I think probably the only, state in world history where it was a crime not only to profess your faith, but to believe.

Maria Panayiotou: People weren't allowed to keep a beard because that was a symbol of Orthodox priests. Everyone had to be clean-shaven. That's how bad it was.

John Arnold: One of many reasons why it was an advantage to be a woman, if you were a believer. Then there was a marvellous moment when we could drop that exceptive clause. Since then the Church, particularly the Orthodox Church, has revived very remarkably. One thing, again we haven't got time to go into it, but let's not just talk about the survival of faith in previously communist-dominated lands; there has been some real revival. Under the saintly Archbishop—

Maria Panayiotou: Anastasios.

John Arnold: Anastasios, Albanian Orthodoxy has revived, and has very good relations with I think the majority Muslim population, and a substantial minority Roman Catholic one. I'm so glad you brought in the point which I frequently find myself having to make in discussions, about the Orthodox historical experience being entirely different from that of the West. This again leads to people misunderstanding, for example, the apparent lack of standing up.

Maria Panayiotou: Yes.

John Arnold: In the West we like heroes, we like people who stand up. Of course, the history of the Western Church is of tension between Church and state, and that is what has made Western Europe so dynamic. As in the Investiture Controversy, or the Pope against the emperor, or King Henry II against Becket in my own cathedral, the history of the West gets its dynamism from these very strong tensions. First of all, Christian ideology in the West from Constantine was of harmony between Church and state, sometimes incorrectly called Caesaropapism. In any case, in the actual experience of Orthodox Christians, since the fifteenth century almost all Orthodox have lived for centuries under the Tartars or under the Turks or under the Tsars or under the communists. Very few of them, practically none, had any idea of what it is to live in anything approaching a democratic or an open society. I've talked a lot about Alexei, who I knew well, and even the young Archbishop Kyrill, but it's really impossible to communicate this to people who both individually but also culturally have absolutely no understanding of it. The mistake made by the Western side is to think that our historical experience is normative. One of the things we have to do in this project is to understand the Orthodox experience as normative for them. Thanks for raising that.

Maria Panayiotou: One last point is that my experience, when doing my research in Albania, is of the speed with which religion came back. I think we see that it wasn't abolished in the hearts of people, it just went underground. It came back so quickly afterwards.

XD: Exactly.

JA: That's right.

DK: Michael, do you want to respond?

MB: A couple of points about Albania. It was always on the agenda of Keston College. I myself visited Albania before the collapse of communism and wrote about it. I remember very distinctly, as if it were yesterday, visiting what had been and now is again the Roman Catholic cathedral in Shkodër, and it had become a sports hall.

During all those years we kept a watching brief on Albania, including reading atheist articles in the Albanian press. We had someone, not a paid member of staff but somebody who contributed to our archives, to our information service, and quite regularly we put out information about the communist campaign against religion, which, as has been said, was relentless in Albania. If you were to go to the Keston archive, which is now housed at Baylor University in Texas, you would find quite an extensive archive on what happened to the churches during those terrible years. The exclusion of priests, and indeed lay people with a story, was an unending tragedy which ended happily with the rebirth not only of the churches but of Islam as well.

John Pollard: Can I just say that I am very puzzled by some of John Arnold's interpretations of the word ideology? The idea that communism was the only ideology strikes me as slightly bizarre. You stated, John, that fascism was just a ragbag, but I'm afraid that this is just a typical Anglo-Saxon misunderstanding of fascist ideology. Nazi ideology was fascist, it wasn't a ragbag, and indeed it was strong enough and compelling enough to lead to a horrendous racial project. It led not only to the genocide that was the Holocaust but to the genocide of millions of Slavs in Poland, and also of Russian prisoners of war. Really this raises a much, much more basic question, which is whether we aren't establishing over-fine, over-subtle distinctions, untenable distinctions, between religions on the one hand and ideologies on the other. Sometimes ideologies turn out to be the distortion or the perversion of religious faith.

Serafim Florea: I want to invite the panel to discuss what the Cold War means and define the period. In my opinion the Cold War began somewhere in 1917 with the revolution when all this new ideology and indoctrination began, and it will be almost finished, fingers crossed, very soon. So there is a century's worth of ideology, of not questioning the authority of governments oppressing their own people, and also not questioning the authority of clerics in the churches who were not doing their jobs properly. It isn't finished yet, so I invite us to speak about the Cold War which hasn't finished, which continues, and which actually is not the Soviet Union against the West, because the legacy of both is basically an age of stupidity from both sides. There is a very good movie called *The Age of Stupid* which I invite you to see, but let's discuss how the real Cold War was between the so-called governments or groups taking over, controlling the citizens and oppressing their human rights, their religious liberties and so on. That continues in different forms even today.

Our friend from Germany said that the challenge now for the churches is to put off the masks of ideology and take up the cross of what they are called to do as Christians, to call for justice, peace and truth. Of all these values the most immediate one which is

needed, I believe, is justice. We all speak about democracy, but in my studies of government and diplomacy and so on I think this is a concept that was buried long ago. We do not have democracy anywhere in the world at the moment. What is the state of the Cold War at present in the twenty-first century? Do we have a Cold War in the twenty-first century, or did it end in '89 with the fall of the Berlin War?

DK: I think that is a subject for another seminar. There's a question over here.

Kelvin Knight: One or two stray thoughts on the history of ideas. If I could intervene in the disagreement between John and John, I was intrigued by your earlier reference to Berdyaev and to Marxist ideology as a Judaeo-Christian heresy. One reason why I thought Berdyaev was referred to is that he was an influence on someone who has not been mentioned. Paul knows his history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; you attribute it to Eleanor Roosevelt but of course the Maronite, Charles Malik, was the most important Christian influence on it. There's an appallingly widespread myth that somehow Jacques Maritain was the author of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which he was not. Maritain was an important voice in Catholicism at the time of the Cold War, and was himself influenced, I think, quite importantly by Berdyaev. He was a voice, at least within the Roman Catholic Church, and took a principled stance in saying that communism and Christianity are two different conceptions of the good. For Maritain they were two different conceptions of human rights.

Admittedly, by then the Catholic Church had helped, although whether fascism is a ragbag or not depends on the definition of fascism. The first serious academic analysis of it, by Ernst Nolte, identified the first phase of fascism as a reaction against modernity which was very much a ragbag, which Maritain was associated with, incidentally. I think I'm slightly losing my train of thought on the history of ideas, due to too much work and lack of sleep. Maritain was happy to say that Christianity and communism were two different conceptions of the human good. Perhaps that maps onto the much commented-on distinction between Eastern and Western Christian traditions, because Maritain was happy to acknowledge not just the human rights of the Helsinki period, the individual dissidents and so on, but also the social and economic rights, second and third generation rights, about which we've heard so much since the Cold War.

DK: Did you have a question, Lucian?

Lucian Leustean: I have two points, but before that I would really like to congratulate Dianne for bringing together such an impressive panel. There have not been many studies on the Cold War and religion in the more than twenty years that have passed since then, so it is good to see that the British participants are really interested in this area. I would like to think that perhaps other countries as well will try in future to do the same thing.

I said I have two points; I would like to add to the debate on the Roman Catholic Church, which is very much connected to Philip's ideas. How unique was the Cold War? I was very pleased to hear Michael Bourdeaux's comment that he really thought he would see unification between the Anglican and the Orthodox in his lifetime. If we look at the archival research which has started to emerge in the last twenty years, a

very interesting phenomenon can be witnessed by the end of the 1940s, or the beginning of the '50s, with the idea that a new world had to be created that would hopefully renounce the religious.

In Bucharest I found a very interesting document about the communists who were writing secret articles, writing everything that was happening from a religious perspective. They wrote at one point about what the Pope, the Holy See, thought about the Romanian patriarch who was being appointed, the Cardinal of the East. So I said to myself, this must be a mistake or propaganda. How could it be real, knowing the differences between the Catholics and the Orthodox? But to my surprise, a few years ago I spoke to a Catholic scholar who completely depended on my own research. He also found in archival sources that by the end of the 1940s there was a discussion about the unification of Christianity and how perhaps the Second World War was the new start that would abolish religious borders between the Catholic, the Orthodox and the Protestant.

So my first question would be, have you ever felt this in your work during the Cold War, or did you feel that it was just about religious survival behind the Iron Curtain? Or is it about perhaps trying to work towards the unification of Christianity? That's the first point. Secondly, something completely missing from the discussion today is the European community. I know Paul Oestreicher has been involved in discussions with the ecumenical centre in Brussels. During the Cold War did you ever have the feeling that what was happening in Brussels and Strasbourg had any influence on your discussion with Eastern counterparts, or was it a completely Western matter?

John Arnold: I was not only president of the Conference of European Churches but also a member of the ecumenical commission to the European institutions. For most of the period of the Cold War we had a difficulty in that we wanted to represent the churches as a whole to the European institutions, which are unique. No other continent in the world has anything like them. Like the Emperor Constantine they would rather deal with one group of churches than with several. However, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and their churches were not allowed to have anything to do with the European institutions, which were seen as being on the other side in the Cold War. The way we dealt with this structurally was by having a separate commission which enabled the Western European churches to relate to the European Union. These bodies have now come together, that's just at the structural level.

To go back to the previous question, Christian unity made very great strides during the period of the Cold War, although that was to some extent on a different track. But there were enormous advances in ecumenism between 1945 and 1989 or '90, which I think are roughly the parameters of this project, the Stalinist project. We're taking that as the period. It was probably the greatest leap forward in ecumenism, and the summoning and the results of the Second Vatican Council were really crucial. They took place right in the middle of this, in '63 to '64, and I could go into this in great detail. The heyday of ecumenism actually coincided with the Cold War, but that's a separate topic for a different seminar.

To go back to the point of human rights, it's right to pay respect to Charles Malik, who was a very great man. But in fact the key moment in the framing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the incorporation of religious liberty. The people

who were trying to get a declaration were on the whole shying away from that, because they thought it would be too difficult. It is greatly to the credit of an American Lutheran professor called Frederick Nolde with generous sabbatical leave from his university. Frederick Nolde and a Jesuit called Sullivan worked away at this, and there was a crucial moment between them and the head of the Pakistani delegation. Remember that Pakistan had only just been invented and it was going to be a model Islamic state. I can't remember the name of the person involved, but Frederick Nolde took him aside.

Kelvin Knight: Was it Kabir?

John Arnold: It could be, but my memories fail. It was a wonderful example, not just of ecumenical co-operation, but of interfaith co-operation. By getting the Pakistani delegation to drop its objections religious liberty was included among human rights. I don't know whether you knew that that was the background to the work of Keston. The inclusion of religious liberty in human rights is an extraordinary achievement of those early years, and that is at the universal level.

PO: This has already been said in different ways, but we have not emerged from a world in which there are no more ideologies. Ideology is a human thought pattern and they will always recur. I think the fascist mentality is a very real ideology. It is a mentality which covers a great deal, and it is around now, it is growing in many places. I think that at the moment we are caught in a massive ideology which most Americans still take for granted. I say most but many significant Americans don't, you can generalise too much. The idea that market forces determine the nature of humanity is a powerful ideology. People think that market forces rule us, not governments but economic forces. It is a new version of the Marxist perversion which says that economics determine everything. It is also a Marxist heresy and we are back with that heresy in a different form, saying that market forces are of their nature what we need to obey and governments must be subservient to them. This is a massive ideology which is around, and may be already in the process of breaking up, but I don't know.

DK: I think that's a very good point to end on, thank you very much for that. Thank you everybody for coming, and our thanks to the panel. All this material will be available on line for the general public, activists, and anyone who is interested.